By Juha Räikkä, Jukka Varelius
This quantity gathers jointly formerly unpublished articles targeting the connection among choice version and autonomy in reference to human enhancement and within the end-of-life context. the price of person autonomy is a cornerstone of liberal societies. whereas there are assorted conceptions of the suggestion, it's debatable that on any believable realizing of person autonomy an self sufficient agent must keep in mind the stipulations that circumscribe its activities. but it has additionally been steered that permitting one’s recommendations to impact one’s personal tastes threatens autonomy. whereas this phenomenon has bought a few consciousness in different parts of ethical philosophy, it has seldom been thought of in bioethics. This ebook combines for the 1st time the themes of choice version, person autonomy, and selecting to die or to reinforce human capacities in a distinct and complete quantity, filling an incredible wisdom hole within the modern bioethics literature.
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Extra info for Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life
Furthermore, it seems plausible that simple information about the world would not alter my general preference that the Redskins win the Super Bowl, as compared to some other football team, etc. Notice that the “cognitive idealization” clause is essential for the proposal in question. Indeed, even a bare preference is itself a form of endorsement of a particular object. If I prefer to attend Columbia rather than attending Harvard, this is a form of endorsement of my attendance at Columbia. What is essential for this account, however, is the conjecture that cognitive idealization will slough off those preferences one has that are merely adaptive or do not express the genuine values such preferences are adaptations from.
Note that a significant way in which preferences are adaptive are on the basis of existing social realities such as oppression, poverty, lack of opportunity. But adaptation to these realities can be rational for all the reasons just mentioned. But if and when policymakers are choosing to change social structures, or to assess the quality of such structures, it would be “ethically deeply mistaken” (Sen 1987, 46) to assess their quality in light of our rational preference revision to the social status quo.
Moral demands, the requirements of respect for others, or some (independent of preference) measure of the objective good. But adaptation seems different: adaptive preferences do not (or do not necessarily) fail to conform to some external measure, but rather with an internal measure. But what is this internal measure? Surely adaptive preferences do not lack normative authority because they do not measure up to what I previously valued; this would render virtually all instances of changed preferences normative failures.